锦标赛激励促进还是抑制企业创新?

An Empirical Study of the Effect of Tournament Incentives on Corporate Innovation: Evidence from China

企业创新是需要管理层和员工的共同努力,企业内部管理层和员工间锦标赛激励促进还是抑制企业创新是本文的研究问题。本文基于2007-2015年我国非金融类A股上市公司的样本数据,实证研究发现,以企业内部管理层与员工之间薪酬差距来衡量的锦标赛激励与企业创新呈现倒U型关系,即当锦标赛激励强度在较低水平上时,锦标赛激励强度的提升能够促进企业的创新,当锦标赛激励强度超过一定水平时,则会增加员工的不公平感,抑制企业创新。进一步研究发现,在那些平均薪酬水平较高的企业,员工能够容忍锦标赛激励带来的负面影响。本文丰富了企业创新的研究,也为锦标赛经济后果和薪酬机制设计提供了新的证据。

Whether or not the tournament incentives encourage or inhibit corporate innovation in China is an important question. This paper does therotical and emprical analysis of the impacts of tournament incentive on corporate innovation. This paper measures tournament incentives using the pay gap between executives and ordinary employees. The emprical results show that the tournament incentive on corporate innovation has an inverse U-shape impact on corporate innovation. Further,this paper shows that the firms having the higher pay level can tolerate a higher pay gap. The research results enrich research literature on corporate innovation,and provide new knowledge on the effectiveness of the tournament incentive.