制度背景、董事长任期与企业技术创新绩效

Institutional Background,Chairmen's Tenure and the Performance of Enterprise Technology Innovation

本文以我国2011-2015年沪深两市A股类上市公司为研究样本,在委托代理理论分析框架中,考察了董事长任期对技术创新绩效的影响及其制度因素的调节作用。研究发现,技术创新绩效与董事长既有任期呈倒U型关系,与预期任期呈正相关关系;股权制衡、报酬激励机制和市场竞争在董事长任期的影响中均有一定的调节作用。区分了企业产权性质后发现,董事长任期对技术创新绩效的影响在国有样本中显著于非国有样本;股权制衡、报酬激励机制和市场竞争的调节作用在非国有样本中均好于国有样本。这些研究结论表明,合理选择董事长任期、完善制度环境、深化国企产权改革对抑制董事长的道德风险,充分发挥董事长在企业技术创新中的作用有着重要意义。

This paper selects A shares of listed companies of Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2011 to 2015 as research samples,and makes empirical analysis of the effect of chairmen＇s term on enterprise technology innovation performance and the moderate effect of institutional background in this relationship based on principal-agent theory. The study finds that the performance of enterprise technology innovation has inverted U type relationship with the established term of chairmen of the board and positive relationship with the expected term of chairmen of the board. The balance of ownership,the compensation incentive and market competition play a certain regulatory role in moderating the chairmen＇s term and technology innovation performance. Considering the enterprise property we found that the impact of chairmen＇s tenure on technological innovation performance in state-owned samples significantly to non-state-owned samples; The balance of ownership, the compensation incentive and market competition play a positive role in moderating the chairmen＇s term and technology innovation performance in non-state-owned samples significantly to stateowned samples. These conclusions have a certain reference significance for the in-depth study of the relationship between the chairmen＇s ternures and enterprise technology innovation,and for strengthening the mixed ownership reform of stateowned enterprises.