晋升激励与创业板上市公司创新绩效

Promotion Incentive and Innovation Performance of ChiNext Company

选用全部创业板上市公司为研究样本,探讨了企业内部晋升激励对创新绩效的影响。实证研究表明,内部高管晋升激励抑制了企业创新项目投入和产出,员工晋升激励则促进了企业创新水平提升;在企业研发投入保持不变的情况下,高管激励仍会抑制企业创新产出,员工激励则会显著正向促进企业创新绩效提升;进一步研究发现,晋升激励对企业创新绩效的影响因企业成长性水平不同存在较大差异。研究重新认识了晋升激励这一心理契约对于创新绩效的影响,对企业采取科学的激励机制具有重要的理论和实践意义。

This paper investigated the impact of internal promotion incentive on innovation performance with a sample of the Chinese ChiNext companies.The empirical results show that the internal top managers' promotion incentive inhibits the input and output of the enterprise innovation project,and the staffs' promotion incentive promotes the innovation level of the enterprise.Under the situation that the enterprise R&D investment remains unchanged,the top managers' incentive will inhibit the innovation out of the enterprise.Staffs' promotion incentive are significantly positive to the innovation performance of enterprise.Further research shows that the effect of promotion incentive on enterprise innovation performance will be different due to the difference of enterprise growth.The research re-recognizes the influence of the promotion contract on the innovation performance,and has important theoretical and practical significance to the motivation mechanism of the enterprise personnel.