摘要
无形资产质押融资是解决高新技术企业融资难的一个有效途径,但由于银企双方信息不对称,逆向选择和道德风险问题普遍存在,实际操作中困难重重。文章通过不完全信息动态博弈分析发现:只有通过适当的激励相容约束,达成分离均衡状态,才能保障无形资产质押融资的顺利实施;政府通过无形资产估值阶段的规范化、严惩造假企业以及保护申贷企业私人信息等政策措施均可提高企业造假成本,鼓励企业诚信申贷;银行通过实施不同的贷前尽职调查可对企业造假行为产生震慑作用,但应慎用差别化的贷款策略。
For high-tech enterprises, intangible assets pledge financing is an effective approach to solve their current difficulties in financing. However, this financial device is hard to implement due to information asymmetry, adverse selection and moral hazard. Through analyzing the dynamic game model with incomplete information, conclusions can be drawn: Only by designing incentive compatible constraints to achieve separation equilibrium can intangible assets pledge financing be guaranteed to implement smoothly. Then government should standardize intangible assets evaluation process, publish relevant administration regulations to punish enterprises with fraud and to protect the private information of businesses that apply for loans. In this way, the cost of fraud will be raised, and honest applications are encouraged. Finally, Banks should conduct various pre-loan investigations so as to deter fraud, and should be careful with differentiated loan strategies.
作者
王轶英
姚海鑫
薄澜
WANG Yiying;YAO Haixin;BO Lan(Business School, Liaoning University, Shenyang 110136, China;Sun Wah International Business School, Liaoning University, Shenyang 110136, China)
出处
《辽宁大学学报(哲学社会科学版)》
CSSCI
2017年第5期92-101,共10页
Journal of Liaoning University(Philosophy and Social Sciences Edition)
基金
辽宁大学青年科研基金项目(2012LDQN21)
关键词
无形资产质押融资
高新技术企业
不完全信息
动态博弈
分离均衡
intangible assets pledge financing
high-tech enterprises
incomplete information
dynamic game
separation equilibrium