哈特与德沃金法理学中的维特根斯坦

Ludwig Wittgenstein in Hart's and Dworkin's Jurisprudence

在意义与真理的问题上,维特根斯坦的后期哲学是批判指涉主义与逻辑完美主义的。在法理学探讨中,德沃金援引维特根斯坦,是因为德沃金在根本上认同维特根斯坦的后期哲学;与此相对,哈特对维特根斯坦后期哲学的援引,仅仅是对其著作中某些孤立语篇的认同,是一种断章取义的误解。哈特引用他们,只是借助他们来指出无形的规则是存在着的,哈特本人采取外在视角的方法来对规则进行客观中立的描述,显然与维特根斯坦的后期哲学是水火不容、尖锐对立的。

O n meaning and truth, Ludwig Wittgenstein^ later philosophy is a refutation of referentialismand logical perfectionism. Fundamentally Ronald Dworkin accepts Ludwig Wittgenstein^ later philosoph y , while by contrast, H . L . A Hart’s reference to Ludwig Wittgenstein’s later philosophy is a kind ofmisinterpretation based on s om e isolated discourses. H . L . A Hart claims that a morally neutral descriptionof rules can be procured by external point of v ie w, but this claim is sharply opposed to LudwigWittgenstein’s later philosophy.