论股东固有权的权利性质

On the Nature of Shareholder's Vested Rights

自2005年我国新公司法实施以来,裁判实践中已出现以侵害少数股东的固有权、否认股东会决议效力的方式,对其进行救济的诸多案例。但是由于股东固有权权利性质的理论学说存在不足,造成了对股东固有权自身理解上的困扰,减损了其制衡资本多数决滥用的正当性。通过对股东固有权起源的考察,在以契约理论为视角分析域外相关判例的基础上,重新厘定股东固有权的权利性质,有益于减少学界认知上的分歧,彰显股东固有权理论引导我国司法裁判、平衡多数股东利益与少数股东保护的实践价值。

Since the implementation of the new company law of our country in 2005,there have been many cases relieving the minority shareholders by means of infringing the vested rights of the shareholders and denying the effectiveness of the resolutions of the shareholders＇ meeting in the practice.However, the defects of the existing theoretical doctrine of the nature of shareholders＇ vested rights, causes obsessions with the understanding of the vested rights of shareholders＇ and weakens the justification of the majority capital abuse.Through the exploration of the origin of the vested rights of shareholders,on the basis of the analysis of the relevant cases abroad in the perspective of contract theory, redefining the nature of the shareholders＇ vested rights is beneficial to reducing academic cognitive differences,highlighting the practice value of the shareholders＇ vested rights of guiding the judiciary and balancing the interests of majority shareholders.