专业硕士研究生企业实践的博弈模型分析

An analysis on the game model of professional master′s enterprise practice

为解决因企业不提供技能指导可能引起的专业硕士研究生企业实践环节不努力的问题,文章采用博弈论建立并求解了学校两种监管模式下的企业技能指导投入与研究生实习行为博弈模型。研究结果表明,学校进行严格监管时企业更倾向于提供技能指导;学生是否努力主要取决于不努力的机会成本与努力实习获得的隐性收益之间的大小关系;当企业的技能指导成本和学生机会成本都适中的情况下,两者的决策行为存在不稳定性。文章从学校、政府、实践企业、学生四个方面提出了一些改进措施。

In order to solve the problem that professional master students don＇t work hard during the practice owing to enterprises＇ failure to provide technical guidance, the paper uses the game theory to establish the game model of the enterprise＇s skill guidance input and the postgraduate internship be- havior model under the universities＇ two kinds of supervision modes. The results show that the enter- prise is more likely to provide technical guidance when the university strictly supervise students; whether the students make great efforts or not mainly depends on the relationship between the oppor- tunity cost of non-striving and the implicit benefits of striving during the internship; when the enter- prise＇s skill guide costs and students＇ opportunity costs are moderate, the two kinds of decision-mak- ing behaviors are unstable. The paper puts forward some improvement measures from four aspects： u- niversities, the government, practice enterprises and students.