摘要
为确定影响物流企业员工安全参与行为的因素与演化路径,推动对物流企业员工的安全监管,在员工和物流企业具有有限理性的前提下,从物流企业与员工之间的博弈机理出发,构建了员工安全参与行为的演化博弈模型。采用系统动力学方法分析模型的演化趋势,通过数值仿真分析物流企业员工安全参与行为及演化路径。结果表明,奖励力度、惩罚力度等参数影响着员工策略的变化,物流企业可加大对员工不积极参与安全行为的处罚力度,并适当提高奖励力度,从而提高员工的参与安全活动的积极性;物流企业还应建立奖励与惩戒相结合的管理制度,同时通过技术创新降低监督成本,实现对员工安全的有效监管。
The article is aimed at introducing its research results of building up an evolutionary game model and its application results in evaluating the safety participation of the employees of the logistics enterprises based on the game theory and its limited rationality based on the SD model. For the said purpose,we would like to propose to establish an evolutionary game model based on the safety participation initiatives of the employees,in which a series of game variables involved are defined and stipulated,for example,the game payment function between the logistics enterprises and the employees. What is more,to determine the factors that may affect their safety participation in such enterprises and the evolutionary pathways to promote the comprehensive safety management of the logistics employees,we have also applied the system dynamics to the simulation of the evolutionary trends of the dynamic model and to formulate the stable equilibrium of the game evolution. The simulation results demonstrate that the behavior strategy of the employees should be inevitability influenced by the reward and punishment in accordance with their own performance or behaviors,the cost of the supervision and other parameters given by the logistics enterprises in a number of different ways. And,in turn,it is also of great significance for the logistics enterprises to increase the punishments for the staff members who are not actively involved in the safety behavior and reduce the cost of the supervision of their enterprises so as to encourage and inspire the working enthusiasm of the employees to take an active participation in the security activities. Thus,the logistics enterprises should establish a comprehensive management strategy system of incentives and punishment so as to achieve the effective supervision over the employees' safety activities through the technical innovation and management measures and style.
出处
《安全与环境学报》
CAS
CSCD
北大核心
2017年第5期1844-1848,共5页
Journal of Safety and Environment
基金
四川省科技厅软科学项目(2017ZR0153)
关键词
安全管理工程
物流企业
安全参与行为
演化博弈
系统动力学
safety control
logistics enterprises
safety participa-tion behavior
evolutionary game
system dynamics