土地出让收入与地方政府支出投资偏向——影响机理及实证检验

Land-transferring Fee and Investment Bias of Local Government Expenditure——Influence Mechanism and Empirical Test

本文通过对2001—2014年30个省、直辖市、自治区面板数据分析,从理论与实证的角度验证了在中国特有的财政体制和土地制度下,土地财政是造成地方政府支出投资偏向的重要因素,并通过"自我累加"机制和"一般公共预算收入""财政分权"的交互作用三种影响机理对地方政府支出结构产生扭曲效应。通过分区域和分时段研究还发现,这种影响机理还存在一定的分离均衡。本文的研究表明,为了淡化地方财政支出的投资职能,除了要改革财政分权体制和地方官员的晋升锦标竞赛制度以外,还要加强土地出让收入的管理与分配制度改革,拓宽地方政府投资项目的融资渠道和融资方式。

This paper empirically tests the theoretical findings that the land-transferring fee is one of the important factors contributing to the investment bias of local government expenditure,using the panel data of 30 provinces from 2001 to 2014. Under Chinese characteristic fiscal and land system,the land-transferring fee distorts the local government expenditure structure through three influence mechanisms,namely the self-reinforced mechanism and the interaction between general public budget income and fiscal decentralization. Furthermore,it is found the existence of the separating equilibrium under different areas and times. Therefore,to correct the biased local government expenditure structure should not only reform the institution of Chinese fiscal decentralization and officials' promotion,but more importantly strengthen the management of land-transferring fees and expand the financing channel of the local government's investment projects.