基于碳排放的闭环供应链政府奖惩机制研究

Research on Government Reward and Punishment Mechanism in Closed-Loop Supply Chain Based on Carbon Emission

温室气体的排放问题已成为国际社会亟待解决的问题,解决这一问题的必由之路就是通过降低产品碳排量实现从源头上减排。本文研究由一个制造商和一个零售商组成的逆向供应链系统,建立了政府实施回收奖惩机制的动态博弈模型,比较分析了有无政府回收奖惩机制两种情形下零售商的回收比例、供应链参与方的期望利润和产品的碳排放总量。研究结果表明,政府回收奖惩机制提高了回收比例和碳减排水平;当再制造减排程度较小时,政府回收奖惩机制降低了碳排放总量;基于消费者低碳偏好的政府回收奖惩机制提高了制造商和零售商的利润,更大程度的降低了产品总碳排放量;政府回收奖惩机制下较小的目标回收率能够最大化零售商利润。

The issue of greenhouse gas emissions has become an urgent problem to be solved by the international community. The only way to solve this problem is to reduce emissions from the source by reducing product carbon emissions. This paper studies the reverse supply chain system composed of a manufacturer and a retailer,and it establishes the dynamic game model of the government to implement the reward and punishment mechanism,it compares and analyzes the proportion of the retailer’s recovery,the supply chain profit and the total amount of carbon emissions. The results show that the government recycling reward and punishment mechanism has improved the rate of recycling and the level of carbon emissions;when the degree of re-manufacturing reduction is smaller,the government recycling reward and punishment mechanism reduces the total amount of carbon emissions;the government recruiting incentives based on low-carbon preferences improves the profits of manufacturers and retailers,and it reduces the total product carbon emissions at a large extent;the smaller target recovery rate based on government recycling reward and punishment mechanism can maximize the profits of retailer.