政府补贴与战略性新兴产业资本配置——来自上市公司样本的实证研究

Government Subsidies and Capital Allocation of Strategic Emerging Industries——An Empirical Study Based on Samples of Listed Companies

基于政府补贴介入将通过多重机制影响战略性新兴产业资本配置效率的理论预期,在数理分析基础上构建投资模型,对补贴介入影响投资的复杂机制及效应进行实证检验。结果表明,补贴介入金融市场,对效率与非效率组企业存在不同作用机制:介入股权市场时,使效率组企业资金约束加剧,而使非效率组企业获得更大幅度的金融支持;介入债权市场时信号作用明显,这有助于提高占比75%的效率组企业资本配置效率,却会与股权融资共同促使另外25%的非效率组企业盲目投资。补贴介入市场不确定性时,使所有企业创新动力减弱,阻碍其向高端化发展;补贴的影响存在行业间异质性,少数行业出现了产业政策依赖。

Based on the theoretical projection that intervention of government subsidies will affect capital allocation efficiency of strategic emerging industries through multiple mechanisms, this paper builds an investment model on top of mathematical analysis and carries out an empirical test on the effects and mechanism through which government subsidies affect the capital allocation efficiency. Results show that there are different mechanisms for enterprises in efficient groups and inefficient groups when subsidies get involved in financial mar- kets. When subsidies go to the equity market, it aggravates capital constraint on efficient group, but provides more substantial financial support to the inefficient group. When the subsidies go into the credit market, the signaling effect is obvious which helps boosting cap- ital allocation efficiency of the efficient group who takes up 75% of all enterprises. But combined with equity financing, it will lead to blind investment in the inefficient group who takes up the other 25%. The uncertainty of the subsidies intervention in the market weak- ens all the enterprises＇ innovation initiative, which can hinder their development towards a high end. There is heterogeneity among in- dustries in the effect of subsidies in that policy dependence occurs in some industries.