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Will Performance Evaluation Boost SOE Innovation?

Will Performance Evaluation Boost SOE Innovation?
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摘要 There are two opposing views over the necessity of privatization for SOEs. While some believe that privatization is the only solution to SOE inefficiency, others contend that privatization will lead to serious loss of state assets without resolving the problem. This paper examined how performance evaluation system contributed to the innovation and profitability of central SOEs after the implementation of the revised Interim Measures for Assessment of the Operational Performance of Persons in Charge of Central Enterprises in 2009. Using this revision as a natural experiment, this paper conducted a difference-indifference analysis and discovered a significant improvement in the innovation of central SOEs after the implementation of the new policy as compared with private firms not affected by this system. Moreover, the revised performance evaluation system significantly improved the marginal contribution of innovation to corporate value. The above test result indicates that SOEs may become more efficient solely by altering executive incentives without privatization. In this sense, privatization may not be the only solution to SOE inefficiency. This paper offers theoretical insights on the controversies regarding SOE privatization and helps enrich relevant literature on corporate incentives and innovation. There are two opposing views over the necessity of privatization for SOEs. While some believe that privatization is the only solution to SOE inefficiency, others contend that privatization will lead to serious loss of state assets without resolving the problem. This paper examined how performance evaluation system contributed to the innovation and profitability of central SOEs after the implementation of the revised Interim Measures for Assessment of the Operational Performance of Persons in Charge of Central Enterprises in 2009. Using this revision as a natural experiment, this paper conducted a difference-in- difference analysis and discovered a significant improvement in the innovation of central SOEs after the implementation of the new policy as compared with private firms not affected by this system, Moreover, the revised performance evaluation system significantly improved the marginal contribution of innovation to corporate value. The above test result indicates that SOEs may become more efficient solely by altering executive incentives without privatization. In this sense, privatization may not be the only solution to SOE inefficiency. This paper offers theoretical insights on the controversies regarding SOE privatization and helps enrich relevant literature on corporate incentives and innovation.
出处 《China Economist》 2017年第6期100-113,共14页 中国经济学人(英文版)
基金 supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(Grant No.:71172205,71372126,71502161,71572133 and 71672134) the Humanities and Social Science Project of the Ministry of Education(Grant No.:15YJA630057)
关键词 创新能力 绩效评估 国有企业 中央企业 绩效评价体系 企业效率 私有化 企业负责人 corporate innovation, performance evaluation, incentives, agency problem
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