终极控制人特征与内部人交易行为关系研究

The Relation Between Characteristics of Ultimate Owner and Behavior of Insider Trading

拥有优势信息的内部人通过知情交易牟利,损害了外部投资者特别是中小投资者的利益。内部人交易问题成为监管者和投资者关注的热点问题。本文以2012-2016年深圳证券交易所上市公司为样本,追溯上市公司控制权结构,研究了终极控制人的行为动机与能力对内部人交易行为的影响。研究表明,当终极控制人为政府时,监管内部人的动机和能力较低,内部人交易发生的可能性更大;当现金流权和控制权的分离程度较高时,终极控制人具备侵占上市公司的动机和能力,与内部人合谋进而纵容内部人交易的可能性更大;终极控制人至上市公司之间的层级越多,委托代理成本越高,监管动机和能力越弱,越容易导致内部人交易行为的发生。

Informed insiders could gain benefit from insider trading sacrificing the interests of minority in- vestors. Insider trading is a hot issue attracting the eyes of regulators and investors. Taking listed compa- nies in Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 2012 to 2014 as asample, this paper investigates the impact of con- trolling motivation and ability of ultimate owner on insider trading. The results indicate that companies controlled by government ultimately have a higher probability of insider trading due to lack of monitoring. It also shows that there is a positive relationship between the degree of separation between voting rights and cash flow rights and insider trading. Because ultimate owner might collude with insiders and indul- gence towards them. The results also show that the controlling hierarchies from ultimate owner to listed companies is positively associated with insider trading. It indicates that the longer the hierarchies are, the more agent cost would incur, which leads to insider trading.