内部私人关系与中小板上市公司总经理激励

Internal Personal Connections and Pay-performance Sensitivity of SME Board Company

本文以2010-2014年中小板上市公司为研究对象,首先检验了总经理与董事长之间的私人关系对总经理薪酬-业绩敏感性的影响,发现总经理与董事长之间存在"可辨别私人关系"比不存在私人关系时,总经理的薪酬-业绩敏感性更强;然后考察私人关系建立的途径,发现只有通过职业途径建立私人关系,即总经理与董事长之间存在"前同事关系"时,总经理薪酬-业绩敏感性才会更强,而非职业途径建立的私人关系并不具有这种"增强效应";最后对比业绩上升与下降时私人关系对薪酬-业绩敏感性的影响,发现业绩下滑时仍会出现薪酬粘性。本文的研究结论既丰富了"关系与经理人激励"的文献,也有助于中小板上市公司更加全面地理解改善薪酬激励契约的有效途径。

The paper examines the impact of the personal connections between the general manager and chairman of the board on the compensation performance sensitivity of the firms in the small and mediumsized board from 2010 to 2014. The study shows that compared to non-personal relationships samples, the samples with a personal relationship have stronger executive compensation performance sensitivity. Secondly, considering how the pathway established, the compensation performance sensitivity is stronger in the samples which the personal relationships have been established by career paths than in the samples which the personal relationships have been established by non-career paths. Thirdly, pay performance sensitivity is stronger in the companies which performance has been enhanced than in the companies which the performance decreased. These results enriched the literatures of ＂the relationship and the manager incentive＂, and the results can also encourage small and medium board listed companies to understand how to improve their incentive system on a relationship point.