摘要
本文基于一般均衡模型阐述了税收竞争通过改变资本投入量及政府环保支出进而影响环境污染的作用机制,并使用2007-2014年中国28个省份数据,运用动态空间杜宾及动态面板模型进行了实证检验。研究表明:外溢性污染物存在空间溢出效应;地方政府税收竞争强度越大,地区环境质量就越恶劣。究其原因,在于税收竞争通过改变本地资本投入量及本地政府环保支出提高了外溢性污染物(二氧化硫)和非外溢性污染物(固体废弃物)的排放量,而通过改变邻近地区资本投入量及其环保支出降低了外溢性污染物(二氧化硫)的排放量。
Based on general equilibrium model, we build a theory model of the influence of tax competition on regional environmental pollution and the transmission mechanism. Based on the data of China's 28 provinces from 2007 to 2014, we use dynamic spatial Durbin model and dynamic panel model to verify the theoretical model. The results show that mutually-spillover effect pollution emission has the characteristic of spatial spillover and that more intensive tax competition may induce more environmental pollution. The reason is that tax competition increases mutually-spillover effect pollution (SO2) and non-spillover effect pollution (solid waste) emissions through local capital flow and local public environmental expenditure. Meanwhile, tax competition decreases mutually-spillover effect pollution (SO2) through neighbor local capital flow and neighbor public environmental expenditure.
出处
《财贸经济》
CSSCI
北大核心
2017年第11期131-146,共16页
Finance & Trade Economics
基金
国家社会科学基金一般项目"产权制度及区域差异视角下的中国环境资源税制研究"(14BJY168)
关键词
税收竞争
政府环保支出
环境污染
资本流动
Tax Competition, Public Environmental Expenditure, Environmental Pollution, Capital Flow