摘要
大股东违约风险是否会影响公司的融资约束?进一步地,大股东违约风险与公司融资约束的关系受到哪些因素的影响?通过对我国2010—2015年A股上市公司进行研究后发现,大股东的违约风险较低可以降低公司的融资约束,而且大股东掌控的资源越多,其违约风险对公司融资约束的影响越大。这给我们的启示是:大股东违约风险会通过股权链条传导至其他公司,而且这种传导机制具有放大效应。这根源于大股东违约风险会影响其在公司中"管家"与"小偷"的角色选择,即低违约风险的大股东更可能会在公司中扮演"管家"的角色,而高违约风险的大股东更可能在公司中扮演"小偷"的角色。
Does the default risk of large shareholders affect companies＇ financial constraints？ What are the factors that af- fect the relationship between large shareholders＇ default risk and companies＇ financial constraints？ After we have investigated into the listed companies from 2010 to 2015, we find that large shareholders with lower default risk reduce financial constraints. We also find that the effect of large shareholders＇ default risk on financial constrains is strong for large shareholders with more resources. Our results suggest that large shareholders＇ default risk would be transmitted to companies through equity chain, and this transmission mechanism has risk amplification effect. The reason for this is that the default risk of large shareholders will af- fect their role choice in the company.
出处
《南京财经大学学报》
2017年第5期81-91,共11页
Journal of Nanjing University of Finance and Economics
基金
国家自然科学基金群体项目(71421002)
关键词
大股东
违约风险
融资约束
掏空
救助
large shareholders
default risk
financial constraint
tunnel
prop
