中央和地方关系视角下的金融监管——一个小额贷款行业的实证研究

Financial Regulation under the Relationship between Central and Local Governments:An Empirical Study of Small Loan Industries in China

讨论金融监管领域的中央和地方关系问题,实证方法可提供便捷研究进路。分析各地颁布的小额贷款公司规则和中央规则的差异,可以看出其对该地区小额贷款行业发展程度的影响。各地规则中存在与中央"指导意见"直接冲突的规定,而不同地方"冲突型"规则与"指导意见"偏离程度存在不同,这是"阿里小贷"从浙江省"迁"往重庆市获得快速发展的重要因素,但"阿里小贷"的成功并不具有全国范围的普遍意义。各地方规则中存在大量"指导意见"中没有的"扩展型"规则,而"扩展型"规则越多的地方,小额贷款行业发展越不好。"扩展型"规则带来了个别地方政府"寻租性"行为的可能性,也反应了个别地方政府为保护利益相关方而采取"审慎性"监管行为的倾向,这反应了金融监管领域中央和地方关系的复杂性,为理解金融监管领域的中央和地方关系提供了新的视角。

Empirical research method provides a new approach to the studies on the relationship between the central and local governments in financial regulation.The study of the differences of rules between provincial governments and central government on small loan industries can reveal the impact of these differences upon the development of small loan industries in different provinces.Provincial rules contain provisions conflicting with those of the central rule,and rules of different provinces conflict with the central rule in different degrees,which is the key factor that causes the Alibaba small loan company to move from Zhejiang to Chongqing.However,the success of Alibaba small loan company is not a case that can be replicated throughout the country.Provincial rules also contain provisions that do not exist in central government.The more expansionary provisions contained in the rules of a province,the poorer development of small loan industries is in that province.These expansionary rules create a possibility of rent-seeking by provincial governments.Expansionary rules also reflect a prudential behavior of provincial governments for the purpose of protecting the stakeholders involved in small loan companies.The existence of both rent-seeking and prudential behavioral patterns shows the complexity of the relationship between the central and local governments in financial regulation.It also provides a new angle for analyzing the central and local governments＇ relationship.