基于复制动态的消费者众筹策略演化动态

Evolutionary dynamics of consumers' crowdfunding strategies based on replicator dynamics

采用大群体反复博弈-复制动态演化博弈,在公平贡献和利他主义两种情景下,建立了有限理性的消费者群体通过模仿学习不断调整支持众筹和不支持众筹两策略多人博弈的演化系统.通过对不同参数变化对系统演化稳定均衡及吸引域的影响分析,研究了存在消费者后悔度条件下各因素对众筹演化成功的影响机制.研究发现,公平贡献机制下不考虑后悔度,则支持众筹策略占优,考虑众筹失败带给消费者后悔产生负效益时,当融资目标越小,产品质量越高,消费者偏好越大,团体效用越大,越有利于众筹演化成功,然而发行份额的增加会带给消费者搭便车的投机行为,从而抑制众筹成功.在利他主义策略下,消费者偏好、产品质量和团体效用越大,越有利于众筹演化成功,但是当融资目标不变而发行份额增加时,消费者搭便车的行为却没有增加,反而提高了众筹演化成功的概率.

Use large group repeated game-replicator dynamics research on consumer groups who are bounded rationality got through imitating and learning to update their strategies supporting or non- supporting crowdfunding under two scenarios fairness and altruism contribution rule. Established two people mult-strategy evolutionary game dynamic equations. Through analyzing the change of different pa- rameters how to influence on the evolutionary stable equilibrium and the basin of attraction of the system, considering the failure of crowdfunding bringing regrets this paper researched the effects of crowdfunding success from different factors. The study find that under the fair contribution mechanism and without regard to regrets, supporting is the dominant strategy. Considering the failure of crowdfunding bringing regrets and generating negative benefit to consumer, when the target is smaller, the higher of the product quality level, the bigger of consumer＇s preferences and group benefits, the more beneficial to the crowd- funding evolutionary success. But the increasing of issued shares brings consumer＇s free-riding behavior, thus it restrains the success of crowdfunding. Under the altruism behavior, the bigger of consumer＇s pref- erences and group benefits, the higher of product quality level, the more beneficial to the crowdfundingevolutionary success, When financing target is fixed and the issued shares is increased, free-rider behavior don＇t increase, instead the success probability of crowdfunding be enhanced.