第三方物流与需求方的监督博弈分析

Supervision and Game Analysis of the Third Party Logistics and Demand Side

物流外包过程中,第三方物流的道德问题给物流需求方带来了极大的风险,如何有效规避风险是需求方亟待解决的问题。监督与激励机制则是一种有效的手段,它能减少第三方物流违规的风险,提高服务商的服务水平。本文基于非合作博弈的理论与方法,构建第三方物流与需求方的监督博弈模型,分析博弈双方决策行为,求出混合策略纳什均衡点,分析影响第三方物流与需求方决策的要素,为需求方的有效监督提供了理论依据与相关对策。

In the process of logistics outsourcing,the moral problem of the third party logistics brings great risk to the logistics demand side.How to avoid the risk is the problem that the demand side needs to solve urgently.Supervision and incentive mechanism is an effective means,it can reduce the risk of third-party logistics violations,improve the service level of service providers.Based on the theory and method of non-cooperative game,this paper constructs the third-party logistics and the demand side’s supervisory game model,analyzes the game’s decision-making behavior,finds the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium point,analyzes the factors that affect the third party logistics and demand side decision-The effective supervision of the party provides the theoretical basis and related countermeasures.