政治不确定性与管理层自愿业绩预测

Political Uncertainty and Voluntary Management Earnings Forecasts

本文以2006-2013年我国A股上市公司为样本,以企业总部所在省份的省委书记变更作为政治不确定性的衡量,研究了政治不确定性对于管理层自愿业绩预告和预告精确度的影响。结果发现,在官员变更的当年,管理层会更倾向于自愿发布业绩预告,并且业绩预告的精确度也会提高。进一步研究发现,政治不确定性对业绩预告自愿披露倾向和精确度的影响在民营企业、新任官员为外部调任时、分析师跟踪人数更多的公司中更为显著。最后本文也从资本市场反应的角度进行了补充检验,发现市场在政治不确定性更高时对业绩预告的反应也更强烈。本文的发现对于理解政治不确定性的微观影响及管理层自愿业绩预测的作用都有一定的贡献。

This paper examines the effect of political uncertainty on voluntary management earnings forecasts. Using Chinese A-share listed companies from 2006 to 2013,we find that managers are more likely to issue earnings forecasts and increase earnings forecasts precision after the turnoverof Provincial Party Secretary. The effect is more pronounced for Non-State Owned Enterprises,when the new official comes from other provinces,or for firms with more analyst coverage. Further analysis shows that the market reaction to earnings forecasts is stronger when political uncertainty is high. Our study sheds light on the real effects of political uncertainty and contributes to the understanding of voluntary management earnings forecast behaviors.