股权激励模式与企业非效率投资行为研究——基于代理成本中介和股权集中调节的视角

Research on Equity Incentive Model and Inefficient Investment Behavior of Enterprises:Based on the Perspective of Agency Cost Mediator and Equity Concentration Moderator

基于委托代理理论和2010-2015年234家实施股权激励上市公司的样本数据,探讨了股权激励模式对企业非效率投资行为的影响机制。研究发现,与限制性股票激励模式相比,股票期权激励模式对过度投资的影响更显著,对投资不足的影响不存在统计意义上的显著性;代理成本在股票期权激励模式与企业过度投资之间起部分中介作用;股权集中度会弱化股票期权激励模式对过度投资的抑制效果;同时也会弱化股票期权激励模式与代理成本之间的关系强度。

Based on the principal-agent theory and the sample data of 234 equity incentive listed companies in 2010-2015 years,the influence mechanism of the equity incentive model on the inefficient investment behavior of enterprises was deeply explored.The study found that stock option incentive model of excessive investment is more significant than the restricted stock incentive model and the effect of insufficient investment is not of significant statistical significance;agency cost plays a partial mediating role between excessive investment and enterprise stock option incentive mode.Ownership concentration will weaken the inhibitory effect of stock option incentive model of excessive investment and the relationship between the strength and the weakening of the stock option incentive mode agency cost.