预算软约束下的地方政府融资行为——基于城投债视角的实证研究

Soft Budget Constraint and Local Government Financing Behavior:An Empirical Study Based on the Perspective of Quasi-municipal Bonds

本文从城投债的视角来研究预算软约束影响下的地方政府融资行为,使用2008-2016年地方政府融资平台发行的城投债数据,分析了国务院43号文(简称43号文)政策冲击下地方政府特征对城投债信用利差的影响。研究发现:(1)地方政府公共预算收入与城投债信用利差负相关,表明地方政府对城投债存在预算软约束,这种软约束体现在政府的显性或隐性担保。且这种担保在43号文颁布后仍然存在,只是担保显示由显性转为隐性;(2)城投公司所属的行政级别对城投债信用利差有显著性影响,且城投公司所属行政级别越高,其利差越低;(3)城投公司的财务指标、运营状况对城投债的发行信用利差无显著影响,而宏观经济指标、融资平台的资产规模、债券期限、债券规模等因素则会对融资平台发行债券的利差产生较为显著的影响。

This paper studies how soft budget constraint affects financing behavior of local governments from theperspective of quasi-municipal bond, and analyzes the influence of local governments＇ characteristics on thecredit spread of quasi-municipal bond with the policy impact of State Council＇s No.43 document （No.43 docu-ment）, using the quasi-municipal bond data issued by local government financing platform in 2008-2016. It is found that： （1） the local government＇s public budget income is negatively correlated with the credit spread of thecity investment bond, which indicates that the local government has guaranteed the city investment debt, andthis guarantee still exists after the promulgation of the No. 43 document; （2） the administrative level of the lo-cal government financing platform hasa significant impact on the credit spreads of the city investment bonds,and the higher the administrative level of the financing platform, the lower the spreads; （3） the macro environ-ment, bonds characteristics and the issuer＇s asset-liability ratio havea significant impact on the issuance of in-vestment bonds, but the profitability of local government financing platform has no significant impact on the is-suance of investment bonds.