摘要
融资融券交易机制的启动是我国证券市场信用交易制度的重大突破。本文利用放松卖空管制这一准自然实验,采用双重差分模型、配对样本以及安慰剂实验的方法,系统考察了卖空机制对审计定价的影响。研究发现:(1)放松卖空管制后,审计师向融券标的公司收取了更多的审计费用;(2)这一现象在会计稳健性差和治理水平低的公司中更加明显;(3)动态视角下,卖空机制对审计定价的影响具有瞬时效应,而不具有持续性;(4)引入卖空机制会使审计师的审计工时延长,标的公司被监管部门处罚的概率加大,标的公司被媒体报道的负面消息增多,相应导致审计成本、审计风险以及认知风险增加,进而抬高审计定价。
The setup of margin trading is a breakthrough in credit trading system for Chinese security market. Under such a context,this paper examines how short selling influences audit pricing based on the quasi-natural experiment. By using approaches of difference-in-differences design,matched sample and placebo test,we find that( 1) auditors charge their clients higher audit fees when these firms are available to short sellers;( 2) this effect is more pronounced for firms with weaker accounting conservatism and corporate governance;( 3) dynamically,there is an instant increase in audit fees at the point of the deregulation,after which audit fees remain stable;( 4) the introduction of short sale mechanism promotes audit pricing by increasing audit delay,probability of sanction by the regulators and negative news,which leads to a rise in audit effort,audit risk and cognitive risk,respectively.
出处
《预测》
CSSCI
北大核心
2017年第6期30-36,42,共8页
Forecasting
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71472148)
中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助项目(sk2016011)
