羞感伦理何以可能是自律的?

How is It Possible for the Ethics of Shame to be Autonomic?

在古希腊罗马时期已被谈论的"内在化羞感"以及在先秦儒家被重视的"羞恶之心",在根本上都并非本尼迪克特等人所谓的诉诸外部的习俗伦常的"外在化羞感",因而植基于这种"内在化羞感"之上的羞感伦理也不必被视为"他律的"。当代新儒家借助于批判性地吸收康德的自律伦理学,创造性地发展出一门儒家的自律伦理学,这大大扩展了羞感伦理学的问题:不仅须讨论羞之体验,亦须关注能羞之在。这一交互人格性的"能羞之在"并非康德意义上的"无个性"的理性主体,而是在其自身之内融贯有"内在化他者",因而是具体而真实的。自律的羞感伦理的核心意义就在于,能羞之在服从其自身立的法,这一服从的动力亦在此能羞之在自身。

Shame,whether in Greco-Roman or Confucian ethics,should not be a kind of"externalized shame"(as put by Ruth Benedict)which appeals to external moral relations.In other words,an ethics of shame need not be seen as heteronomous.When contemporary Neo-Confucianism develops an autonomic ethics by critically absorbing Kant's ethics,it discusses the relation between the experience of shame and the being of shame.The latter is not the"characterless"rational subject in the Kantian sense,but rather embraces the"internalized other",through which the interpersonal being of shame is real and concrete.In an autonomic ethics of shame,the being of shame obeys the set of laws by itself,and the drive of this obedience is contained within itself as well.