摘要
随着我国林权制度的改革,林权分配问题引起了社会关注,尤其是林权利益相关群体的关注。林业发展所产生的利益分配不公引起的林权纠纷也日益突出。文章认为,引起林权纠纷的根本原因在于初始林权分配不均导致的利益分配不公,通过建立"多林权群体"与"少林权群体"这两个参与林权纠纷的群体的演化博弈模型,分析了各个博弈群体的演化稳定策略及其稳定性。研究结果表明,通过演化稳定策略调整各林权利益群体的林权配置,并使其均等化,可以有效解决林权纠纷,并达到林权配置的社会最优化程度。
With the development of reform of collective forest land tenure, forest land tenure allocation is a matter of society. The unfair distribution of forest benefits generates the forest land tenure dissention.The prime cause of the forest land tenure dissention is the unfair distribution of forest land tenure initial allocation which caused the unfair distribution of forest benefits. Through establishment of evolutionary game model that was composed of two groups who have participated in reform of collective forest land tenure, namely, "more forest land tenure group"and "little forest land tenure group", this paper analyzed the evolutionary stable strategy of each game group. Conclusion of this study showed that, through the evolutionary stable strategy adjnstforest land tenureallocation of forest land tenure benefit clusters to make the fair distribution of forest land tenure, which could solve the forest land tenure dissention and achieve the social optimization of forest land tenure allocation.
出处
《林业经济》
北大核心
2017年第11期83-86,共4页
Forestry Economics
基金
西京学院院科研基金项目"集体林权制度改革中的林权纠纷研究"(编号:XJ170110)
关键词
林权制度改革
林权分配
演化博弈
reform of collective forest land tenure
forest land tenureallocation
evolutionary game