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食品安全事件公开报道合谋问题的演化博弈分析 被引量:1

Analysis on the Evolutionary Game of the Collusion of Food Safety Incident Public Report
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摘要 食品安全信息不对称情形下,食品企业与媒体间合谋影响着食品安全信息的传播,增加了消费者防御性支出与风险成本,降低了资源配置效率。本文针对食品安全事件公开报道合谋问题,通过对食品企业、媒体与监管部门在有限理性假设下的演化博弈分析,探讨食品企业与媒体合谋达成的原因。博弈过程中,建立追溯赔偿机制,完善针对食品企业的奖惩机制,制定食品行业退出机制,建立媒体权利清单与责任清单,通过技术方式实现流量多渠道变现,设立有吸引力的举报激励机制,进一步降低监管部门行政成本,是破解食品企业与媒体合谋难题的有效对策。 With the information asymmetry of food safety, the collusion between food companies and media influences the spread of food safety information, increasing the defensive spending and risk cost of consumers, reducing the efficiency of resource allocation. According to the conspired problem of food safety reporting, this paper explores the causes of conspiracy between food companies and media, by building an evolutionary game model of the food industry, media, and regulators under the hypothesis of bounded rationality. It proposes the effective countermeasures to the conspiracy between food enterprises and media, which includes establishing compensation mechanism for traceability, perfecting the mechanism of rewards and punishments for food companies, developing the food industry exit mechanism, establishing media rights list and responsibilities list, realizing technical flow through various channels to liquidate, establishing attractive incentive mechanism and further reducing administrative costs.
作者 景娜 张月义
出处 《标准科学》 2017年第11期95-101,共7页 Standard Science
基金 浙江省自然科学基金"食品安全公共治理研究-信息不对称视角"(项目编号:LY17G030028)资助
关键词 食品安全 媒体报道 演化博弈 合谋 food safety, media report, evolutionary game, collusion
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