认知的具身性——自然主义哲学的一个潜在困难

The Embodiment of Cognition:An Underlying Dilemma for Naturalism

自然主义哲学蕴含着自我反驳的困难。一方面,自然主义奠基于自然科学的巨大成功,即能够系统化地获得关于客观世界的真知识。另一方面,根据自然化的认知观,认知是具身性的,知识是根据感官信息做出的构建,而非对客观世界的反映。如果按照自然化的认知观,不预设知识与客观世界的对应关系,科学知识的有效性就是难以理解的,自然主义就无法基于自然科学的成功被建立。解决这一困难的可能方案是,主张自然科学原则上以人的主观经验为对象,且人的主观经验是完全概念化的。

Naturalism philosophy entails a dilemma of self-refutation. On one hand,naturalism is grounded on the huge success of natural science,which is being able to systematically acquire true knowledge of the objective world. On the other,according to the naturalized view of cognition,cognition is embodied,and knowledge is a construction based on sensory information rather than a reflection of the objective world. If the naturalized view of cognition was adopted and the correspondence between knowledge and the objective world was not be presupposed,the validity of scientific knowledge would be difficult to understand and naturalism would not be established on the ground of the success of natural science. A possible solution to this problem is suggesting that,in principle,natural science takes subjective experience of human as its object,and subjective experience of human is totally conceptualized.