商业保险对存货质押融资的激励作用

The Incentive Effect of Commercial Insurance on Inventory Financing

商业保险作为企业分散经营风险的一种有效手段,越来越受到重视,并被逐渐引入到信贷融资中。分析了存货质押融资下破产成本对融资的约束,以及商业保险缓解融资约束的机理。通过比较无商业保险和有商业保险时资金约束企业的最优订货量和最优利润,研究商业保险对存货质押融资的激励作用。研究发现,商业保险会激励存货质押融资的企业提高订货量;存在着保费的临界值,使得企业只有在保费低于该临界值时才会购买保险,并且该临界值随企业采购预算的增加而减少,随企业破产成本的增加而增加。研究结论为中小微企业拓宽融资渠道,缓解资金压力提供了指导。

As an effective method for firms to spread the operational risks, commercial insurance has been paid more and more attention and introduced into credit financing. In this paper, we build an inventory financing model to analyze the constraint of the bankruptcy costs and the remission of the commercial insurance. Firm＇s optimal ordering quantities and optimal profits under the capital constraint are compared in the cases for both with and without commercial insurance, in order to investigate the incentive effect of commercial insurance on the inventory financing. Our results show that the commercial insurance has an incentive to increase the ordering quantity for the firm who adopts inventory financing. In particular, there exists a critical value such that the firm will buy insurance only if the insurance premium is lower than the critical value. Moreover, the critical value is decreasing in the firm＇s purchase budget and increasing in the firm＇s bankruptcy cost. Our study offers valuable suggestions for medium-small and micro-sized enterprises to broaden the financing channel and relieve the capital pressure.