风险波动下带有努力水平的回馈与惩罚契约模型

Reward and Publish Contract Models with Effort Level and Risk Fluctuations in Consideration

以单个制造商单个零售商两级供应链模型为研究对象,考虑制造商的努力水平和销售价格的线性需求函数,分别讨论了在无风险波动下集中和分散两种情形下的供应链优化问题。通过协调分析得到,回馈与惩罚契约是可以实现供应链成员的双赢,并给出协调过程中的最优销售目标和批发价。进一步,考虑了在无风险波动和有风险波动两种情形下契约中相关参数的灵敏度分析以及相应的管理启示。

This paper studies a two-stage supply chain model with single manufacturer and single retailer, and the demand is a linear function of manufacturer＇s effort level and the selling price. We then discuss both the centralized and decentralized supply chain optimization problem under the case of no-risk volatility fluctuation involved. Reward and punish contract can achieve the win-win situation for supply chain members through the analysis of coordination corporations, which also gives the optimal critical quantity and wholesale price in the process of coordination. We further consider the contracts with no-risk and risk volatility functions involved, and provide some managerial insights by performing the sensitivity analysis of related parameters.