高管专业背景与城投公司企业债融资成本——基于地市级及区县级城投公司的经验证据

Executives with Professional Background and Financing Cost of Quasi-municipal Corporate Bonds——Empirical Research Based on City-level and County-level Quasi-municipal Companies

城投公司自身造血能力目前还相对较弱,债务滚动是其持续发展的支撑和保障,因而降低债务融资成本对城投公司来说至关重要。本文以2012~2015年我国地市级及区县级城投公司发行的企业债券为样本,考察聘用具有专业背景的高管对城投公司企业债券融资成本的影响。研究发现,聘用具有专业背景的高管的确可以降低城投公司企业债券的发行成本,提升具有专业背景的高管比例可以加强这一机制作用。进一步,聘用具有银行背景和会计师事务所背景的高管降低发行成本效果更为显著。本文的研究结果有助于加深对城投公司的公司治理与债务融资成本关系的理解,同时有助于明晰高管专业背景在其中的具体传导机制及其引起的经济后果。

Because of the characters of quasi-municipal companies, they usually need to borrow debts to keep development. As a result, it is important for them to reduce financing cost. Using data of city-level and county-level quasi-municipal companies in China from 2012 to 2015 as a sample, this paper finds engaging executives with professional background significantly decreases the financing cost of quasi-municipal corporate bonds, and the higher percentage, the more decrease. In addition, engaging executives with the background of banks and accounting firms has more striking influence on reducing cost. The conclusion of this paper helps us enhance understanding on the relationship between corporate goverance of quasi-municipal companies and financing cost of debts, and the transmission mechanism of engaging executives with professional background and economic conseauenees it causes as well.