考察成员双重行为偏好下供应链的契约与协调

Study on the Contracts and Coordination of Supply Chain with the Member Having Dual Behavior Preference

以往的行为供应链研究多考察供应链中成员的单一行为偏好,少有学者将多种行为偏好相结合进行探讨。文章以具有损失规避与公平关切双重行为偏好特征的零售商和完全理性的供应商构成的二级供应链为研究对象,探讨零售商具有双重行为偏好情形下,双方通过回购契约、收益共享契约及回购—收益共享联合契约实现供应链协调的可行性与具体过程,探讨双重行为偏好对于供应链中成员决策过程与结果的影响。鉴于模型的复杂性,文章通过对相关环境参数进行设定,利用实际算例对理论分析进行了阐明和验证。

Most previous studies of behavioral supply chain have focus on members' single behavior preference and fewer have investigated multiple behavior preference in supply chain. This paper studies the influence of dual behavior preference : loss aversion and fairness concern in a two echelon supply chain which is composed of a supplier and a retailer. Discusses the decision characteristic of the two members under the condition that the supplier is completely rational and the retailer has dual behavioral preference. Investigate the feasibility and process of achieving coordination of supply chain under the buyback contract, the revenue sharing contract, and the buyback-revenue joint contract. And in view of the complexity of the decision models, it verifies the theoretical analysis with some numerical examples by ways of setting specific values to the environmental parameters.