不完全信息下的供应链核心企业质量控制机制研究

Study on Quality Control Mechanism of Supply Chain Core Enterprises with Incomplete Information

针对供应链中处于买方垄断地位的核心企业,在依赖供应商的情况下,由于卖方质量优势导致的质量风险和市场失效问题,从买方立场出发,提出了基于质量效用度量和收益分享契约的两种机制,分别在不同场景下解决该问题。并证明了这种解决方案减少了规避信息不对称壁垒带来的效用浪费。

In this paper, in view of the quality risk and market failure caused by seller quality advantage when there is reliance on the supplier in a supply chain dominated by the buyer and from the perspective of the buyer, we proposed two mechanisms respectively based on quality utility measurement and benefit sharing contract to solve these problems in different scenarios. In contrast to those commonly adopted to solve the adverse selection problem with the signal transmission mechanism from the standpoint of the seller, the solutions proposed in this paper could significantly reduce the utility waste brought by information asymmetry.