考虑品牌差异的双渠道供应链减排与低碳宣传策略

Strategy on Low Carbon Emission Reduction,Promotion in Dual Channel Supply Chain Considering Brand Differentiation

针对双渠道供应链低碳减排、低碳宣传与品牌策略问题,构建微分博弈模型,运用汉密尔顿-雅可比-贝尔曼方程分别求得集中决策和Stackelberg博弈下的低碳减排投入、低碳宣传投入和低碳宣传分担率。研究发现:集中决策情形下产品的减排量始终高于Stackelberg博弈情形下的减排量;产品品牌差异化程度与制造商所承担零售商低碳宣传成本的比例呈正相关;供应链成员的最优低碳宣传策略除了与品牌差异程度相关,还取决于供应链成员在不同渠道边际利润的相对大小;存在一个低碳宣传成本分担率能够实现制造商和零售商协调。并用数值算例验证了本文的相关结论。

Aimed at solving the problem of the low-carbon emission reduction, low-carbon promotion and brand strategy in a dual-channel supply chain, a stochastic differential game model is built. By using Hamilton-Jacobi- bellman equation, the optimal low-carbon emission reduction, the optimal advertising input and the optimal advertising sharing rate are solved under centralized and decentralized decision settings respectively. The results show that the low-carbon emission reduction in centralized decision settings is always higher than that in decen- tralized decision settings; the degree of products differentiation is positively correlated with the proportion of the retailer＇s advertising in the traditional channels; the optimal low-carbon promotion strategy for the members of the supply chain not only is related to the difference of the brand, but also depends on the relative size of the marginal profits of the supply chain members in different channels; there exists a low carbon propaganda cost sharing ratio to achieve the coordination of manufacturers and retailers. And a numerical example is used to verify the relevant conclusions of this paper.