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双层博弈理论视阈下特朗普政府的朝核政策 被引量:8

The Trump Administration's Policy towards North Korean Nuclear Issue: An Analysis from the Perspective of Two-Level Game Theory
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摘要 美国的朝核政策是决策者在国际层面博弈和国内层面博弈,以及这两个层面相互博弈的产物。特朗普政府朝核政策的主要特点包括:对朝鲜实行"最大限度施压"政策和"所有牌都摊在桌上"威慑战略,并未完全关闭与朝鲜谈判的大门,以及要求中国对解决朝核问题发挥最大影响力。特朗普总统主导政府朝核政策的决策,但其主要顾问起着一定的纠偏和危机时劝阻作用。美国国会一部分议员反对特朗普政府对朝进行先发制人打击,也有一些议员主张通过对华施压来迫使中国向朝鲜施加最大压力和美国在韩国重新部署战术核武器。 Two-level game theory assumes that government leaders have always been taking actions on both domestic and international stages. They try their best to realize their objectives on the two stages. At the same time,they face with the pressure and restrictions from the two different stages. U. S. Policy towards North Korean nuclear issue is the results of the game-playing by U. S. decision-makers at both domestic and international levels,and of the interaction of the two levels. The major characteristics of the Trump Administration's policy towards North Korean nuclear issue include imposing maximum pressure on North Korea,putting all options on the table,trying to have contacts with North Korea,playing the China card on North Korea,and so on. Although President Trump makes the final decision on the Administration's policy towards North Korean nuclear issue,his major advisers can play some role in rectifying a decision and trying to dissuade him not to make wrong decision during crisis.
作者 夏立平
出处 《美国研究》 CSSCI 北大核心 2017年第6期123-140,共18页 The Chinese Journal of American Studies
基金 笔者主持的中国海洋发展研究会"美国在亚太地区海权联盟体系研究"(项目编号:CAMAZD201608)的中期成果之一 国家社科基金重点项目"构建新型大国关系的理论建构与方略选择"(项目批准号:14AZD060) 国家社科基金重大课题:"习近平治国理念之外交战略思想研究"(15ZDC002)资助
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