价格稳定与金融摩擦:信用传导渠道下货币政策规则初探

Price Stability and Financial Frictions:Monetary Policy Rules under the Credit Transmission Channel

在当前我国利率市场化的背景下,货币政策框架正在从数量型向价格型转变,然而有别于发达国家利率市场化时期高增长、低通胀的经济环境,目前我国所面临的内、外部环境要复杂得多,尤其是经济增速放缓引发的信用风险暴露使得价格型货币政策有效传导的难度更大。本文基于一个货币政策信用传导渠道模型研究各类货币政策与最优政策响应的差异,指出传统泰勒规则和灵活通胀目标制在缓解金融摩擦带来的资源配置无效率方面的不足。进一步地,本文在将各类金融指标作为货币政策目标引入泰勒规则后发现,利差虽然是衡量信用摩擦程度的指示器,但稳定利差的货币政策既不能有效缓解信用摩擦,也无法兼顾价格稳定的目标;而根据商业银行净资本缺口调整名义利率的扩展泰勒规则由于有效地降低了代理人有限责任约束引致的楔形效应,因此为完善信用传导渠道下的货币政策提供了可能的改进方向。

Based on a model of credit transmissionchannel,this paper studies the difference between various monetary policies and the Ramsey optimal policy response,and pointsout the insufficiency of the tradition Taylor rule and the flexible inflation targeting rule in mitigating the inefficiency of resourceallocations caused by financial frictions. Furthermore,by incorporating various financial indicators as monetary policy targets intothe Taylor rule,this paper finds that although credit spread is an indicator of the degree of credit frictions,credit-spread-stabilizingmonetary policy can neither alleviate credit friction nor balance the goal of price stabilization. On the other hand,the extended Taylor rule that adjusts nominal interest rate according to the net capital gap of the commercial bank sector effectively reducesthe wedge effect caused by the agent's limited liability constraint,and thus provides a possible direction for the improvement ofmonetary policy under the credit transmission channel.