基于消费者策略行为的产品服务系统两周期定价策略研究

Pricing Strategies for a Two-Period Product Service System Based on Strategic Consumer Behavior

针对消费者策略性延迟购买行为会影响不同周期的产品服务系统需求与服务使用时间这一问题,构建制造商、服务商与策略性消费者之间的两周期动态博弈模型,探讨不同服务价格占比、不同消费者的策略性程度与不同服务估值占比下制造商和服务商的最优定价策略,分析消费者的策略性程度和服务估值占比对均衡结果的影响。研究表明:当服务价格占比很低、消费者的策略性程度很强、服务估值占比很低时,制造商会采用先低价后高价的定价策略,反之,采用先高价后低价的定价策略;当消费者的策略性程度较强、服务估值占比较低时,服务商会采用渗透定价策略,反之,采用撇脂定价策略;在一定条件下,服务商在第1周期会采用亏本销售定价策略。

Considering that the consumers＇ strategically delaying purchases influence the demand of a product service system and the length of service time during different periods,this study proposes a two-period game model among the manufacturer,the service provider and strategic consumers.The optimal pricing strategies of manufacturer and service provider are discussed under different proportions of service price,different strategic degrees of consumer behavior and different proportions of service valuation,respectively.Moreover,the impacts of the strategic degree of consumer behavior and the proportion of service valuation on equilibrium results are analyzed.The following results are obtained.When the proportion of service price is very low,the strategic degree of consumer behavior is very strong,and when the proportion of service valuation is very low,the manufacturer should adopt the first-period low and the second-period high pricing strategy,otherwise,the manufacturer should adopt the first-period high and the second-period low pricing strategy.When the strategic degree of consumer behavior is relatively strong and the proportion of service valuation is relatively low,the service provider should adopt the penetration pricing strategy,otherwise,the service provider should adopt the skimming pricing strategy.Finally,the service provider should adopt the loss leader pricing strategy in the first period under certain conditions.