基于群体博弈的秸秆焚烧问题分析

Population Games' Analysis about Straw Burning Problem

以农户作为单群体的新视角来看待问题,建立露天焚烧秸秆问题的单群体博弈模型,利用复制动力学来刻画农户的有限理性行为,并以此对模型的Nash平衡进行稳定性分析.研究发现:焚烧秸秆简单易行,短期来看,收益较好,却不知对环境造成的污染是很严重的;不焚烧秸秆成本高,但从长远来看,不焚烧秸秆的收益呈递增趋势;焚烧秸秆对环境造成破坏,不焚烧秸秆的整体社会收益远大于焚烧秸秆;最后,通过模型仿真来对问题进行分析验证,并提出建议与对策来解决露天焚烧秸秆问题.

We constructed a single population game model by regarding farmer as a single population, and characterized the bounded rational behavior by replication dynamics and analysized the stability of Nash equilibria based on that model. We show that the behavior of burning straw is simple and easy, and the benefits are high in the short term, but environmental pol- lutions are serious. Otherwise, the cost of not burning is high, but in the long term, the benefit of non-burning straw is in- creasing. Burning straw is harmful to the environment, and the social benefit of not burning straw is much higher than burning straw. Finally, the problem was analyzed and verified through simulation, and we gave suggestions and solutions to solve the problem of straw burning.