公司过度投资会传染吗?

Will Over-investment Be Contagious?

上市公司过度投资水平是近年来财务研究的重点和热点。文章利用2003~2015年A股上市公司数据为样本,基于"信息传递理论"考虑行业过度投资水平对下一期上市公司投资水平的影响,并从"代理理论"和"信息不对称理论"两种角度分析其背后的作用机理。研究结果表明:同行过度投资加剧下一期上市公司过度投资水平;国有产权性质抑制同行过度投资对下一期公司过度投资的正向关系;CEO权力增加同行过度投资对下一期公司过度投资的正向关系;股价同步性抑制同行过度投资对过度投资的增加程度。此研究不仅丰富了同行效应和过度投资经济后果的研究,更为如何抑制过度投资、维护金融市场稳定提供参考价值。

The level of over-investment of listed companies is the focus and hotspot of financial research in recent years. Using a sample of A-share listed firms from 2003 to 2015, this paper investigates the influence of industrial over-investment on the next investment level of listed firms based on information transfer theory, and analyzes the working mechanism based on agency theory and asymmetric information theory. The results show that: The industrial over-investment exacerbates the level of the next over-investment; State ownership nature' s refraining on industrial over-investment has positive relationship on firms' next over-investment; With the increase of CEO power, industrial over-investment has positive relationship with firms' next over-investment; Stock price synchronicity restrains the increase degree of industrial over-investment to the over-investment increase. This paper not only contributes to the research of industrial effect and the undesirable economic result of over-investment, but also has an important value on restraining over-investment and maintaining financial market stability.