论双边平台横向兼并的反垄断

The Antitrust of Two-sided Platforms' Merger

近年来互联网行业发生了一系列双边平台横向兼并交易,其引发的重要理论问题是双边平台横向兼并与传统横向兼并有何不同?双边平台横向兼并的反垄断理论与实务面临哪些尚待解决的难题?如何对双边平台横向兼并进行反垄断审查?本文对以上问题进行了初步探讨,指出双边平台横向兼并与传统横向兼并的区别主要在于交叉网络外部性的存在为相关产品带来更强的竞争约束,使得市场边界、集中度与市场力量的关系较单边产品更为模糊。双边平台横向兼并的反垄断分析需要警惕双边平台概念的滥用,避免相关市场界定与结构性分析的教条化使用。本文亦指出双边平台横向兼并的反垄断审查面临交叉网络外部性难以测度、SSNIP分析如何修正、单边效应与合理补贴区分等难题,并在此基础上提出一个三阶段的双边平台横向兼并反垄断审查路径。为了更好地阐述相关内容,本文以滴滴出行收购优步中国案为例展开论述。

In recent years, the internet industry has witnessed a series of horizontal mergers between two--sieded platforms, which raises important theoretical issues that what are differences between two-sided platforms＇s mergers and traditional horizontal merger. What are the problems to solve both in theory and practice in antitrust related two-sideness？ And how to conduct a pragmatic review in mergers between platforms.？ This paper makes a preliminary discussion on these issues, and points out that the difference between horizontal mergers and traditional horizontal mergers mainly lays that the existence of cross--network externality might introduce stronger competition constraints compare to single sided mar-ket, which makes the relationship between market boundary, concentration and market power more vague than other products. The antitrust analysis of horizontal mergers related two-sided platforms requires vigilance against the abuse of the conventional concept and avoid the dogmatic use of the relevant market definition and structural analysis. This paper introduces a three -- stage screening criteria to execute merger review of two--sided platforms and points out the main obstacles to properly analyse the competitive effects of two--sided platforms. merger. In this article,the merger of Didi and Uber is taking for example to better illustrate relevant contents.