平均工资、缴费下限与养老保险参保

Average Wage,Minimum Contribution and Pension Insuring

研究目标:研究养老保险参保缴费逆向激励产生的原因、作用机制以及后果。研究方法:通过构建刻画参保者行为的生命周期模型,数值模拟分析平均工资增长对参保者效用的影响;借助自然实验构建固定效应工具变量回归,实证研究平均工资增长对参保行为的影响。研究发现:基于在岗职工平均工资的缴费下限设定,增加了低收入者的实际缴费负担,随着平均工资的提高,在借贷约束的限制下,为保障当期消费,低收入者会退出养老保险制度;平均工资上涨会显著降低参保职工人数,导致缴费遵从度下降。研究创新:通过研究平均工资变化对实际费率负担的影响,揭示低收入者的参保行为。研究价值:为养老保险制度改革,提供理解参保者微观行为的理论框架和实证依据。

Research Objectives： This paper aims to study the origins, mechanism and consequence of the adverse incentives of contribution regime of the basic pension system. Research Meth- ods： This paper employs a life-cycle model that characterizes the behavior of insured and an- alyzes the impact of increasing average wage on the utility of contributors. Furthermore, we employ fixed effect IV-2SLS models with provincial panel data to empirically analyze the in- fluence of average wage on pension insuring. Research Findings： The minimum premium de- termined by the average wage increases the old-age insurance premium of the low wagers, and as the increasing of average wage, the low wagers will drop off from the pension system to ensure the demands on current consumptions under the limit of budget constraint; the in- creasing of the average wage will lower the number of the insured and the compliance. Re- search Innovations： This paper reveals the insuring pattern of low wagers by studying the impact of average wage on the real premium burden. Research Value： This paper provides theoretical framework and empirical evidences to understand the behavior pattern of contrib- utors and design the further pension reform more properly.