高管同期离任与盈余管理合谋——以真实盈余管理为例

Research on the Collusion between Executives' Simultaneous Departure and Earnings Management----Evidence from Real Earnings Management

以公司负责人和财务总监的同期离任为观测对象,并以真实盈余管理为例,实证检验传统的"视界问题"。研究发现:公司负责人在离任前一年存在通过真实盈余管理操控业绩的行为;财务总监的同期离任加剧了公司负责人离任前的真实盈余管理;高管持股和高质量审计能够在一定程度上抑制公司负责人离任前的真实盈余管理,以及公司负责人和财务总监同期离任前的真实盈余管理合谋;高管离任前在不同真实盈余管理方式上存在偏好。

Taking two executives simultaneous departure as the observation object, this paper empirically tested the real earn- ings management before the departure of senior executives, which had been a traditional horizon problem. The research found that, the head of a company had implemented the real earnings management to manipulate the performance a year before departure, The simul- taneous departure of the head and the CFO wouid exacerbate the real earnings management. We proposed that, executive sharehold- ings and high-quality audit could effectively inhibit the real earnings management and the collusion between the head and the CFO before heads＇ departure. It was also concluded that, there were preferences in ways selection of real earnings management before ex- ecutives＇ leaving.