渠道博弈视角下粮食最低收购价政策的效果研究

A Research on the Result of the Minimum Purchase Price of Grain from the Perspective of Channel Game Theory

中国是人口和粮食大国,促进粮食生产、保证粮食安全是国之大事。由于市场利益主体之间存在博弈行为,收购价格由农户与粮食收购企业共同决定。采用纳什议价模型表示议价过程,运用2006年至2014年的小麦价格数据,研究农户和企业在粮食收购过程中的议价问题,从而判断粮食最低收购价的政策效果。结果表明:政策确实能改变农民的议价能力,保护农民利益,但政策实施存在时滞;更重要的是,政策会导致农户议价能力从绝对劣势到绝对优势的突变,造成农户凭借最低收购价获得主导价格的能力,即政策扭曲了市场定价机制。最后,给出模型结果、实证结论和政策建议。

China is the big country =th a large population and grain, so it is important for and ensure food security. Because there exists the game behavior among various subjects of interest in the market, the purcha-sing price is decided by farmers and grain purchasing enterjDrises. Taking the Nasli bargaining model as the bargaining process, using the data about tlie price of wheat from 2006 to 2 0 1 4, this paper studies the bargaining terprises in the process of grain purchase, in order to determine the policy effect of the minimumgrain purchase price. The re-sults show that thie policy can really change the bargaining power of farmers and protect thieir interests, but thie policy has im-plementation lags. More importantly, the policy will lead to a change in the bargaining power of farmers from absolute disad-vantage to absolute advantage, resulting in the ability of farmers to obtain the dominant price at thie lowest purchase price, that is, the policy distorts the market pricing mechanism. Finaiy, this paper gives the model and empirical conclusions and policysuggestions.