辛亥荫昌南下督师及袁世凯出山内情考

Study on Yin Chang's Southward Journey to Lead the Army and Yuan Shikai Taking the Role

辛亥武昌起事后,清廷迅派陆军大臣荫昌南下督师,镇压革命。通过考察陆军大臣荫昌南下行程,可知从1911年10月17日夜抵达信阳到10月22日抵达孝感,荫昌耽搁了近5天之久;从10月22抵达孝感到10月27日黎明令清军进攻,荫昌又耽搁了近5天之久。其行动可谓"一波三折":先"踊跃前行",既而"迟迟不发",最终"固布守局"。荫昌之所以如此,并非因为北洋军不听其命令,也不是他颟顸畏战。而是10月18日清军与革命军首战失利,令荫昌意识到,对付革命军并非易如反掌。因此,荫昌一方面要求调用大炮、机关枪等武器,一方面则赞同袁世凯提出的"固布守局"战略。早在10月21日,在盛宣怀、载泽的幕后推动下,清廷就已决定调回荫昌,予以袁世凯军事全权,目的则是令袁世凯迅速南下。之所以如此,是因为盛宣怀等人主张"速剿",对荫昌在信阳"迟迟未发"十分不满。同时,朝野内外,因"事权不一"之危害,纷纷要求清廷调回荫昌。这也是清廷决定调回荫昌的重要原因。

According to related historical material, in the Minister of Army Yi Chang＇s southward journey to lead the army in 1911, he arrived in Xinyang on 17 October, but did not arrive in Xiaogan until five days later on 22 October. Then it took another five days before he ordered the Qing dynasty army to attack at dawn on 27 October. This military activity underwent a meandering course： at first he marched actively, but then he held back and at last stayed defensive. The reason of Yin Chang＇s unusual performance was neither Beiyang Army disobeyed his order nor he was incompetent or coward. After the Qing army＇s first failure on 18 October, Yin Chang realized it was not easy to cope with the revolutionary army; on one hand he requested the application of cannons and machine guns, but on the other he agreed with the ＂keeping on solid defense＂ strategy proposed by Yuan Shikai. As early as 21 October, the Qing government had decided, under the behind-the-scene propelling of Sheng Xuanhuai and Zai Ze, to call back Yin Chang and give Yuan Shikai full military authority in the condition that Yuan Shikai should promptly march southward. Sheng Xuanhuai and others had advocated ＂rapid extermination of the rebels＂ and had been discontent with Yin Chang holding back in Xinyang. Meanwhile, both the court and the public urged the government to summon back Yin Chang because the separation of leadership and authority was detrimental, which was also an important factor for Yin Chang＇s call-back.