上市公司高管因股价崩盘风险受到惩罚了吗?

Are Executives Punished for Stock Price Crash Risk?

股价崩盘风险会导致股东财富的巨大损失,甚至损害资本市场的效率。已有文献发现,公司高管掩盖坏消息的机会主义行为是导致股价崩盘风险的重要因素,随之,本文关心高管是否会因股价崩盘风险上升而受到惩罚。研究发现,股价崩盘风险与高管薪酬显著负相关,在进行了内生性检验和一系列稳健性测试后,该结论依然存在。这表明,中国上市公司高管的确因为股价崩盘风险而受到了惩罚。在按照所有制、股权结构、机构投资者持股比重和市场化分组的样本中,股价崩盘风险惩罚效应都存在,不过,股价崩盘风险的惩罚效应随着管理者权力的上升而削弱。

Stock price crash leads to big loss of shareholder and even damages the efficiency of capital market. Therefore, stock price crash risk has been a hot topic in the field of finance. Especially after recent financial crisis starting from 2007, the public is interested in the determinants of crash risk. So many paper begins to study the determinants of crash risk. And researches find that the opportunism by executives is main cause of crash. Executives have the incentive to hide bad news. Subsequent research began to investigate the influence of va- rious factors of company executives hiding bad news motivation and ability. But few literatures pay attention to the e- conomic consequences of stock price crash risk. If we are not aware of the negative or positive consequences of the stock price crash, the value of the policy will be greatly reduced. As the actual controller of the company and the shareholder＇s agent, the management should be blame. The most effective mechanism to incentive and constraint management is compensation contract. Then we are concerned about whether the executives are punished for stock crash. If the board of directors works, the executive compensation contract should naturally contain information about stock price crash, which should be accompanied by a reduction in executive pay when a stock price crash oc- curs. But if the board is inefficient, the manager compensation will not be decreased. So it is an empirical question. Based on this, this paper selects China A-share listed companies from 2000 to 2014 as a sample, and systemati- cally studies the impact of stock price crash risk on executive compensation. We find that the executive compensa- tion is negatively associated with stock price crash risk. And the results exist in（ 1 ） SOEs and non-SOEs; （2） firms with different levels of ownership concentration ; （3） firms with different levels of institutional ownership ; and （4） firms located in different regions. Further analysis indicates that the effect is attenuated when the executive is power- ful. This means that the board of directors of China＇s listed companies do consider the stock price crash risk when making executive compensation contracts, which also shows that the executive compensation contract of Chinese lis- ted companies is effective on the whole. This study can not only provide a new perspective for the stock price crash research field, to provide the strategy （ adjustment of executive compensation） to reduce the risk of stock price crash, but also provide new evidence for the topic of executive compensation contract effectiveness of Chinese listed companies. The contributions of this research mainly include the following three aspects：Firstly, the stock price crash risk is a hot topic in the field of financial research, the existing research mainly focuses on the determinants of stock price crash risk, but there is little literature relating to the economic consequences of stock price crash risk. While this paper studies the impact of stock price crash on top management from the perspective of executive compensation contract. So we give the new direction of research for crash risk literature. Secondly, compensation contract is a clas- sical topic in the field of corporate governance research. It has been found that there is a significant positive correla- tion between executive compensation and corporate performance. The extant literature began to examine the influ- ence of non-financial performance indicators, for example, the defects of internal control on the impact of executive compensation; this article studies the impact of non-financial performance indicators on executive compensation contract from the perspective of stock price crash risk. It means that the board of director design the manager com- pensation contract using available information. Thirdly, the results of this study provides new evidence for the effec- tiveness of Chinese listed company executive compensation contract; this study found that executives of listed com- panies will suffer less compensation because of the collapse in stock prices. It provides support for the effectiveness of compensation contract of Listed Companies in China. So it indicates the Chinese corporate governance reform is effective to some degree.