考虑政府补贴下具有公平偏好的绿色供应链博弈模型及契约协调研究

Game Models and Contract of Green Supply Chain Considering Fairness Preference and Government Subsidies

以一个制造商、一个零售商和政府组成三级绿色供应链为背景,本文建立了考虑供应链参与者具有公平偏好、产品绿色度和政府补贴的4种绿色供应链博弈模型:制造商具有公平偏好的Stackelberg博弈模型、零售商具有公平偏好的Stackelberg博弈模型、制造商与零售商均为公平中性的Stackelberg博弈模型和集中决策模型,并对4种博弈模型中各个参数进行比较。研究表明:在只有零售商具有公平偏好的情形中,政府补贴能减弱零售商公平偏好特性对供应链的消极作用,使产品绿色度和社会福利提高到与制造商和零售商均为公平中性的情形相等;而在只有制造商具有公平偏好的情形中,产品绿色度、社会福利等参数仍受公平偏好特性影响。最后,在只有制造商具有公平偏好的Stackelberg博弈模型基础上进一步建立了成本共担的收益共享契约下的博弈模型并进行数值仿真。

Based on a three-stage green supply chain consisting of a manufacturer, a retailer and the government, this pa？per considering the fairness preference, product greenness and government subsidies, four green supply chain game models are es？tablished： a Stackelberg game model based on a manufacturer with fairness preference, a Stackelberg game model based on a retail？er with fairness preference, a Stackelberg game model based on both manufacturer and retailer without fairness preference and acentralized decision-making game model. Meanwhile, four game models are conducted a comparative analysis in terms of each pa？rameter. Results show that： when only retailer has fairness preference, the negative effects on supply chain caused by the fairnesspreference can be weaken by government subsidy, making the product greenness and social welfare equal to the situation where nei？ther manufacturer nor retailer has fairness preference; when only manufacturer has fairness preference, the parameters of productgreenness and social welfare are still influenced by the fairness preference. At last, for the Stackelberg game model based on a man？ufacturer with fairness preference, a revenue-sharing contrast based on research and development cost is established to coordinatethe supply chain. Finally, a numerical simulation is conducted.