双重治理体制下政府碳排放监管博弈分析

Game analysis of carbon emission regulation under dual governance system

中国式分权管理、官员晋升考核的经济锦标赛制度使得地方政府在多目标决策时更关注于经济增长而非环境保护,致使环境规制政策难以有效落到实处。基于国家和企业面临的日趋严峻的碳排放约束和2017年后逐渐形成的阶梯式碳税体系,构建了中央、地方双重治理体制下,中央、地方环保部门同碳排放企业间的三方博弈模型,分析了双层治理体制下实施阶梯式碳税政策对不同主体行为的影响。模型均衡分析和仿真研究发现:双重治理体制下,地方政府对经济绩效的追求会导致地方环保部门放松环境监管,弱化了环境规制的碳减排绩效;实施阶梯式碳税时,企业偷排行为与地方环保部门的检查成本和中央环保部门的审查成本正相关,与偷排惩罚系数反相关,合理的碳排放标准对约束企业的偷排倾向和偷排量有重要影响;实行阶梯式碳税比单一的标准碳税对提升地方环保部门的监管绩效具有更好的激励效果,而单纯的经济手段无法激发地方环保部门的检查积极性,还应辅之以行政手段等其他约束措施。为强化环境规制政策效果,切实达成预期的碳减排目标,必须从制度上打破环境规制的中央-地方双层治理体制,改变政府官员的晋升考核标准。探索实行环保部门的中央垂直管理并合理划分双方权限,将环保指标纳入官员晋升考核,有助于更好地提升地方环保部门的检查激励;尽快建成完善的碳税体系和全国性的碳排放权交易市场,科学制定阶梯式碳税标准和配额标准;同时还应加大执法力度和中央环保部门的审查力度,引入第三方参与以降低环境规制的监管成本等。

Chinese-style decentralized management and economy-oriented promotion system force local government to pay more attention to economic growth rather than environment protection when making multi-objective decision. Based on central-local dual governance system of environmental regulation,this paper established a tripartite game model among central environment protection department,local environment protection department and carbon emission enterprise,and analyzed the influence of implementation of cascade carbon taxing policy to different subject behaviors. The equilibrium analysis of model found that under the dual governance system,local government's pursuit for economic performance will lead to the reduced environment regulation of local environmental protection department as well as the weakened carbon reduction performance of environmental regulation; when implementing cascade carbon taxing policy,enterprise's underlying carbon emission behavior was positively related to the inspection cost of local-central environment protection departments,while negatively related to their penalty coefficient. A reasonable carbon emission criterion is of great importance to restraining enterprises' secret discharge tendency and to reducing enterprises' carbon discharge quantity. Compared with single-standard carbon taxing,cascade carbon taxing can better stimulate local environment protection department to improve regulation performance. Pure economic measure cannot stimulate the local environmental protection departments ' initiative for environmental inspection,for which auxiliary implementation of other measures is necessary. Using central-local dual governance system instead of conventional implementation method of environmental regulation policies,realization of central vertical management of environment protection department,introduction of environmental indexes into official promotion mechanism,and strengthening the inspection force of central environment protection departments are effective methods to improve the effect of carbon reduction policy.