外部审计、高管权力与薪酬粘性

The External Audit,Executive Power and Compensation Sickness

健全薪酬激励机制是实施公司治理的重要环节,而高管的权力寻租行为可能破坏薪酬契约的有效性。作为重要的外部监督机制,外部审计是否能提高薪酬契约的有效性一直备受关注。选取我国2011—2015年沪深A股上市公司数据为样本,在证明高管薪酬存在粘性的基础上,探究外部审计、高管权力对薪酬粘性的影响。结果表明:我国上市公司普遍存在薪酬业绩变动的不对称性,即薪酬粘性;高管权力对薪酬粘性存在显著的正向作用;高质量的外部审计能有效抑制高管权力对薪酬粘性的正向影响。

Improving the salary incentive mechanism is an important part of the implementation of corporate governance, and the executive power rent-seeking behavior could undermine the effectiveness of the compensation contracts. As an important external supervision mechanism,whether the external audit can improve the effectiveness of the compensation contracts,it has been closely watched. Choosing the data of 2011—2015 Shanghai and Shenzhen,a shares listed companies as research samples,on the basis of the existence of compensation sickness,it explores the influence of external audit and executive power to compensation sickness. The results show that the listed companies in China exibit the asymmetry of compensation performance universally, namely pay viscosity; executive power has significant positive effect to pay viscous; high quality external audit can effectively restrain executive power to pay the positive influence of the compensation sickness.