互联网企业横向合并、价格合谋与反垄断监管建议

Horizontal Merger,Price Collusion of Internet Enterprises and Suggestions on Antitrust Regulation

互联网企业以中介平台的经营模式运作,其连接的几类用户之间存在交叉网络外部性的作用。在考虑交叉网络外部性的情况下,研究了互联网企业横向合并后的社会总福利变化,发现当交叉网络外部性强度较大时,互联网企业横向合并后社会总福利会提高。但是如果合并后企业间达成了价格合谋,用户获得的总剩余会降低。建议反垄断监管机构的监管重点从互联网企业的横向合并行为转向合并后可能发生的价格合谋行为。

Internet enterprises operate with the mode of an intermediary platform. There are cross network externalities within several types of users connected by the platform. In the case of considering cross network externalities, the change of total social welfare after the horizontal merger of Internet enterprises was studied. It was found that when intensity of cross network externalities is strong, the total social welfare will increase after horizontal merger of Internet enterprises. However, if price collusion is reached among enterprises after merger, the total surplus obtained by users will decrease. It suggests that the regulatory focus of antitrust regulators should turn around from the behavior of Internet enterprises＇ horizontal merger to possible price collusion after merger.