信息不对称性、经理人特质与谈判——基于转移定价的实验研究

The Impact of Information Asymmetry,Manager Characteristics on Negotiation:An Experiment Research Based on Transfer Pricing

内部转移定价既是组织中业绩评价、激励设定等管理措施的基础，也是资源配置、利益整合的重要环节，而谈判法则为当下公司常用的一种确定内部转移价格的方法。本文运用实验方法探究信息不对称性与经理人特质（内部交易倾向）对转移定价谈判机制的影响。本文发现，信息不对称性会增大谈判破裂的可能性，而经理人特质中的内部交易倾向会减少谈判时间。此外，本文进一步发现在上游分部、拥有私有信息的谈判情境中，由于下游分部对上游分部的实际成本预期会偏低，而上游分部无法有效地传递真实成本信息，信息不对称情形下的转移价格会低于信息完全对称下的价格。本文的研究发现可以为实践中转移定价机制的设定及谈判、定价效率的提升提供借鉴。

Transfer pricing is not only the basis of performance evaluation and incentive measures, but also an important part of resource allocation within a company, while negotia tion is a widely used method to set transfer prices. Based on an experiment, we explore how information asymmetry and manager characteristics affect negotiation. Our research suggests that information asymmetry increases the probability of failed negotiations, and that it takes longer time for low-concern managers to reach an agreement. In the setting when upstream departments have private information, the final transfer prices would be lower when there is information asymmetry, compared to complete information symmetry; this is because down stream departments have lower expectation of the production costs, and the upstream depart ments do not have a credible way to pass their private information to the downstream depart ments. The results can lead to useful suggestions to the setting of transfer price and the im proving of the negotiation behavior.