党组织参与公司治理了吗?——来自中央企业监事会党组织治理的证据

Supervisory Boards,Party Organizations and Corporate Governance:Evidence from the Party Organizations Governance of State-owned Enterprises

本文以2012-2014年219家中央企业（以下简称＂央企＂）上市公司共657个观测点为有效研究样本,手工收集监事会成员是否为党员的身份信息,采用面板数据混合回归模型研究央企监事会党组织治理与企业代理成本的关系,从组织文化的视角考察监事会党组织的治理效应。研究发现：监事会党组织治理有利于抑制第二类代理成本,但对于第一类代理成本并无显著的抑制作用;央企上市公司监事会自身对企业的代理成本（包括第一类和第二类）并无抑制作用,只有在党组织参与监事会的工作中,监事会才具有显著的监督作用,从而证明了党组织参与央企的公司治理具有显著的治理效应。研究结果为提高我国党组织治理水平、优化党企关系、优化监事会制度及提高监事会监督作用提供了参考。

In this paper, we study the influence of party organization governance on cor porate governance. We collected 657 observed value of the personal information of the super- visory board members in 219 central-governmental enterprises from 2012 to 2014 years as the research sample. We use panel pooled regression models to test the relationship between agency cost and party organization governance in the supervisory board of central-governmen- tal enterprises, in order to investigate the efficiency of governance of party organization in su- pervisory board from the perspective of organizational culture. We find that the party organi- zation of the board of supervisors governance is helpful for restraining the second type of agency cost, hut no influence on the first type of agency cost. We also find that the supervi- sory board of central-governmental enterprises itself has no inhibitory effect to agency cost if the party organization does not take part in the supervision board. In conclusion, the corpo- rate governance of central-governmental enterprises will be more efficient when the party organization takes part in the supervision. The findings of this paper are helpful for improving the governance of party organization and supervisory board, and provide recommendation of optimizing the relation between party and companies, and the supervisory board system.